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RELIGION AND GROUP RIGHTS:
ARE CHURCHES (JUST) LIKE THE BOY
SCOUTS?
RICHARD W. GARNETT1
What role do religious communities, groups, and associations
play - and, what role should they play - in our thinking and con-
versations about religious freedom and church-state relations?
These and related questions - that is, questions about the rights
and responsibilities of religious institutions - are timely, diffi-
cult, and important. And yet, they are often neglected.
Consider, just briefly, the hot-button "church-state" disputes
that are the stuff of front-page stories and high-profile court deci-
sions: May governments allow privately owned menorahs and na-
tivity scenes in public parks, or display the Ten Commandments
on the grounds or in the halls of public buildings, or include the
words "under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance? May the state
ban ritual animal sacrifice, or the religiously motivated use of
hallucinogenic tea, or peyote? May a child in public school read a
Bible story from his favorite book, or hand out pencils with a re-
ligious message, or start a Christian after-school club? And so
on.
Cases presenting questions like these are touted as "church-
state" controversies. Certainly, they involve important questions
about the freedom of conscience and the powers and prerogatives
of governments. The image of the lone religious dissenter, heroi-
cally confronting overbearing officials or extravagant assertions
1 John Cardinal O'Hara, C.S.C. Associate Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame.
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of state power, armed only with claims of conscience, is evocative
and timeless. No account of religious freedom would be complete
if it neglected such clashes or failed to celebrate such courage.
And yet, while the "state" is (usually) easy to spot in these cases,
where is the "church"?
It is not new to observe that American judicial decisions and
public conversations about religious freedom tend to focus on
matters of individuals' rights, beliefs, consciences, and practices. 2
The special place, role, and freedoms of groups, associations, and
institutions are often overlooked. 3 However, if we want to under-
stand well, and to appreciate, the content and implications of our
constitutional commitment to religious liberty, we need to
broaden our focus, and to ask, as Professors Lupu and Tuttle
have put it, about the "distinctive place of religious entities in our
constitutional order."4 Are religious institutions special? May
and should they be treated specially? If so, how? Why?
I. CHURCHES, THE BOY SCOUTS, AND DISCRIMINATION
In 2000, the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment
confers and protects a right of the Boy Scouts of America - an
"expressive association" - to engage in what would otherwise be
illegal discrimination in selecting its leaders. 5 This right, the
Court suggested, "is crucial in preventing the majority from im-
posing its views on groups that would rather express other, per-
haps unpopular ideas[,]" and is "especially important in preserv-
ing political and cultural diversity and in shielding dissident
expression from suppression by the government." 6
2 See generally, e.g., Kathleen A. Brady, Religious Organizations and Free Exercise:
The Surprising Lessons of Smith, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1633 (2004).
3 See, e.g., Gerard V. Bradley, Forum Juridicum: Church Autonomy in the
Constitutional Order: The End of Church and State?, 49 LA. L. REV. 1057, 1064 (1987)
(noting that the idea of "church autonomy" sits uneasily in our law and discourse about
religious freedom, because of our 'longstanding blind spot .. .concerning groups of all
kinds").
4 Ira C. Lupu & Robert Tuttle, The Distinctive Place of Religious Entities in our Consti-
tutional Order, 47 VILL. L. REV. 37, 37 (2002).
5 See Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 640 (2000).
6 Id. at 647-48 (quoting Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984)).
See generally, e.g., Richard W. Garnett, The Story of Henry Adams's Soul: Education and
the Expression of Associations, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1841 (2001).
[Vol. 22:2
RELIGIONAND GROUP RIGH7S
Whatever the merits of the Boy Scouts decision, 7 religious in-
stitutions enjoy and exercise a similar, though probably less con-
troversial, license to engage in what could otherwise be illegal
discrimination. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 allows religious or-
ganizations to engage in otherwise unlawful religious discrimina-
tion 8 and a judge-made, though apparently constitutionally
grounded, rule prevents courts from applying anti-discrimination
laws to such organizations' hiring and firing decisions regarding
ministers. 9 These exemptions are, again, widely accepted (even if
there are disagreements about their reach and application).0
But again, we should ask, why? Is there something - something
special, or distinctive - about religious organizations, religious
discrimination, and ministerial positions that justifies or requires
limiting the reach of anti-discrimination laws in this way? Or, is
the theory simply that religious associations - or, for present,
short-hand purposes, "churches" - are, so far as the constitution
is concerned, like the Boy Scouts?
II. SEPARATION AND DISCRIMINATION
In 1988, while out on the campaign trail, then-Vice President
George H.W. Bush recalled being shot down over the South Pa-
cific, as a young pilot during World War II.11 He said:
7 For one critique of Dale, see, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, Article: The First Amendment's Pur-
pose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767 (2001).
8 See Corp. Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 328 (1987) (holding Church of Lat-
ter Day Saints' discharge of employee on religious grounds constitutional under the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and finding that the Act served the permissible purpose of minimizing
governmental interference in the decisionmaking process of religious organizations).
9 See, e.g., Hollins v. Methodist Healthcare, Inc., 474 F.3d 223, 225 (6th Cir. 2007)
("The ministerial exception, a doctrine rooted in the First Amendment's guarantees of re-
ligious freedom, precludes subject matter jurisdiction over claims involving the employ-
ment relationship between a religious institution and its ministerial employees, based on
the institution's constitutional right to be free from judicial interference in the selection of
those employees.").
10 See CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND
THE CONSTITUTION 62 (2006) ("[M]ost people - including many who lament these dis-
criminatory practices - believe that church policies about clergy should be constitutionally
exempt from anti-discrimination statutes."); but cf., MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE
GAVEL: RELIGION AND THE RULE OF LAW (2005); Diana B. Henriques, Where Faith Abides,
Employees Have Few Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2006, at Al.
11 I have recounted this story in other work, including Richard W. Garnett, Pluralism,
Dialogue, and Freedom: Professor Robert Rodes and the Church-State Nexus, 22 J. L. &
REL. 403 (2006-07), from which some of the discussion that follows is adopted.
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Was I scared floating in a little yellow raft off the coast of an
enemy-held island, setting a world record for paddling? Of
course I was. What sustains you in times like that? Well,
you go back to fundamental values. I thought about Mother
and Dad and the strength I got from them, and God and
faith-and the separation of church and state. 12
Now, this train-of-thought seems absurd. At the same time, it
is entirely American. That the would-be President apparently
thought he could not identify "God" and "faith" as "fundamental
values" without awkwardly appending "the separation of church
and state" reveals much about how we Americans think about
the content and implications of religious freedom.
Of course, an earlier President, Thomas Jefferson, in his 1801
Letter to the Danbury Baptists, similarly - if more eloquently -
professed his "sovereign reverence" for the decision of the Ameri-
can people to constitutionalize church-state "separation."13 In so
doing, he supplied what is for many the "authoritative interpre-
tation" of the First Amendment's Religion Clauses.14 Indeed, Pro-
fessor Dreisbach observed not long ago that "[n]o metaphor in
American letters has had a greater influence on law and policy
than Thomas Jefferson's 'wall of separation between church and
state'."15 "Jefferson's words," in Professor Hamburger's words,
"seem to have shaped the nation"16 and are, for many of us,
"more familiar than the words of the First Amendment itself."17
However, that we are familiar, even intimate, with Jefferson's
words hardly means we agree about their meaning. Notwith-
standing our third President's "reverence" for church-state sepa-
ration and the comfort it supplied to our 41st President, the idea
remains both controversial and contestable. What does it mean,
really, for "church" and "state" to be "separate"? Is church-state
"separation" an imaginable reality, let alone a constitutional re-
quirement? Not long ago, then-Rep. Katherine Harris com-
plained that the separation of church and state is a "lie we have
been told" to keep religious believers out of politics and public
12 Cullen Murphy, War Is Heck, WASH. POST, Apr. 8, 1988, at A21.
13 Letter from the Danbury Baptist Association to Thomas Jefferson (Oct 7, 1801).
14 Philip Hamburger, Separation and Interpretation, 18 J. L. & POL. 7, 7 (2002).
15 Daniel L. Dreisbach, Origins and Dangers of the "Wall and Separation" Between
Church and State, IMPRIMIS, Vol. 35, No. 10 (October 2006).
16 PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 1 (2002).
17 See Hamburger, supra note 14, at 7.
[Vol. 22:2
RELIGIONAND GROUP RIGHTS
life.iS Her charge drew widespread, forceful criticism, and seems
well off the mark. Still, Professors Eisgruber and Sager have
reminded us that "it is easy to overlook just how odd and puz-
zling the idea of separation is"; indeed, "[t]he notion of literally
separating the modern state and the modern church is implausi-
ble in the extreme .... Church and state are not separate in the
United States, and could not possibly be separate. The question
is not whether the state should be permitted to affect religion, or
religion permitted to affect the state; the question is how they
should be permitted to affect each other."19
This is not to deny that the institutions of religion (the
"church") are and should be distinguished, and different, from
the institutions of government (the "state").20 It is, instead, only
to echo Justice Douglas, who noted more than fifty years ago that
"separation" does not and, given our traditions, could not mean
that "the state and religion [must] be aliens to each other."21 Af-
ter all, given the size, reach, powers, and aims of contemporary
governments, the segregation of "church" from "state" - let alone
of religion from society, or faith from politics - seems neither
possible nor desirable.
And so, although James Madison insisted, in his Memorial and
Remonstrance, that "[rieligion is wholly exempt from [the] cogni-
zance" of government (or, the "institution of Civil Society"), 22 an
appropriate respect for his arguments should not prevent us from
seeing that American governments do, in fact, take "cognizance"
of religion all the time. To paraphrase the above-quoted asser-
tion by Professors Eisgruber and Sager, the question is not
whether our laws and governments do or will take notice of relig-
ion; it is how, when, and for what purpose they take religion into
account. More specifically, and in Professor McConnell's words,
18 Jim Stratton, Rep. Harris Condemns Separation of Church, State, WASH. POST, Aug.
26, 2006, at A9.
19 EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 10, at 6-7.
20 See id. at 23 ( noting that separation "crisply expresses two different ideals associ-
ated with religious freedom-first, that individuals and churches should be free to pursue
their theological convictions and practices without undue interference from the state; and
second, that citizens and public officials should be able to conduct politics without inap-
propriate interventions by religious institutions and groups.").
21 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312 (1952).
22 Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 64 (1946) (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (quoting
James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments No. 1
(1785)).
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the question is not so much "whether religion should be 'singled
out,' but how, when, and why it should be 'singled out'."23
But maybe this is too quick. That we do "single out" religion -
sometimes for special accommodation, sometimes for special ex-
clusion; sometimes for acknowledgment, sometimes for silence -
might not necessarily justify our doing so. Professors Leiter and
Smith, for example, have expressed and developed their doubts
about the existence of a principled, secular reason for specially
accommodating religion. 24 The central thesis and animating
theme in the new book by Professors Eisgruber aad Sager, Reli-
gious Freedom and the Constitution, is that "aside from [a] deep
concern with equality, we have no reason to confer special consti-
tutional privileges or to impose special constitutional disabilities
on religion."25 That is, "special and distinctive treatment" of re-
ligion is justifiable, when it is justifiable, not so much because of
anything about religion, but because such treatment is some-
times required to secure and protect the "Equal Liberty" to which
we all are entitled under the Constitution. 26 In Professor Kop-
pelman's view, though, even an appropriately agnostic liberal
state may and should accommodate and "recogniz[e] the value of
religion[.]" 27 And, for years and years, scholars have wrestled
with the problem of identifying those accommodations of religion
that the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause might be
thought to require without privileging, advancing, or endorsing
religion in ways that the Establishment Clause might be thought
to prohibit. 28
23 Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out Religion, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 1,
3 (2000).
24 See, e.g., Brian Leiter, Why Tolerate Religion?, U. OF TEXAS LAW, PUBLIC LAW
RESEARCH PAPER No. 100 (2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=904640; Steven D.
Smith, The Rise and Fall of Religious Freedom in Constitutional Discourse, 140 U. PA. L.
REV. 149 (1991).
25 EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 10, at 6.
2 6 Id. at 4, 7.
27 See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, Is It Fair To Give Religion Special Treatment?, 2006
U. ILL. L. REV. 571.
28 See id. ("It is widely believed that the First Amendment puts courts and legislatures
of the United States in a double bind when it comes to religion: requiring them to remain
neutral with respect to religious concerns, while simultaneously protecting these same
concerns."). See generally, e.g., Frederick Mark Gedicks, An Unfirm Foundation: The Re-
grettable Indefensibility of Religious Exemptions, 20 U. Ark. Little Rock L. J. 555 (1998);
Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a Response to the
Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 685 (1992).
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It would not be possible, even if it could be useful, to review
and resolve the accommodation-of-religion debate. Still, we
might return to the questions raised at the outset of this paper:
What is the place, function, and nature of religious institutions in
our constitutional order? Why are these institutions different - if
they are - from others? More particularly, why are churches al-
lowed to engage in what would otherwise be illegal discrimina-
tion in their dealings with ministers? 29 That is, what is the justi-
fication for the so-called "ministerial exception," mentioned
earlier?30 If, for example, it would be illegal for Wal-Mart to fire a
store-manager because of her gender, then why should a relig-
iously affiliated university be permitted to fire a chaplain be-
cause of hers?31 Or, to borrow the example discussed by Profes-
sors Eisgruber and Sager, why should anti-discrimination law
not reach the refusal - or, more precisely, the asserted inability 32
- of the Roman Catholic Church to ordain women as priests?
Eisgruber and Sager consider carefully whether the law's
treatment of this refusal undercuts their argument that "equal
liberty," and not distinctive treatment of religion, is what the Re-
ligion Clauses require.33 In their view, churches' liberty to dis-
criminate when selecting ministers does not reflect religion's or
churches' special status, and is not a result of a constitutionally
mandated "separation" of church and state. Instead, it is better
regarded as rooted in "constitutional values of autonomy and
freedom of association that run to the benefit of all members of
our constitutional community."34 Although indicating dissatisfac-
tion with the Court's reasoning in the Boy Scouts case, they nev-
ertheless invoke that decision as providing a basis for churches'
right to "discriminate", and right that they regard as flowing
29 The terms "church" and "minister" are, admittedly, imprecise and under-inclusive.
The legal rule at issue applies to religious institutions other than "churches," and to peo-
ple other than "ministers."
30 See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, A Syllabus of Errors, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1169, 1181 (2007)
(reviewing MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL: RELIGION AND THE RULE OF LAW
(2005)) ("[Bly judicial interpretation, religious organizations may hire and fire their clergy
and similar religious leaders on any criteria they choose; courts will not entertain law-
suits alleging discrimination of any kind."). See generally Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462
F.3d'294, 303-05 (3d Cir. 2006) (discussing the "ministerial exception").
31 See e.g., Petruska, 462 F.3d at 294.
32 See generally, Pope John Paul II, Ordinatio sacerdotalis (1994).
33 See EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 10, at 62-66.
34 See id. at 63.
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from the general (i.e., not religion-specific) constitutional princi-
ple that "there are a variety of personal relationships in which
members of our political community are free to choose their part-
ners, associates or colleagues without interference from the
state": "[Clontemporary constitutional law endorses associational
freedom [and] the constitutional immunity of the Catholic church
from equal employment opportunity mandates in the choice of
priests can readily be explained as an instance of that free-
dom."35
Are they right? Is it enough - that is, does it capture all that
we want to say about the freedom of religious institutions to
make decisions about training and ordaining ministers and about
the power of governments to oversee and regulate these decisions
- to treat the Roman Catholic Church like the Boy Scouts? 36
Several earlier reviewers - while expressing great admiration of
their project - have expressed doubts about this aspect of the
Eisgruber & Sager approach. 37 I share these doubts. 38 I have
suggested, in other work, that although religious institutions,
like mediating institutions generally, "contribute to the busy and
crowded public square" on which a "free and liberal society...
depends,"39 and serve sometimes as "wrenches in the works of
whatever hegemonizing ambitions government might be tempted
to indulge,"40 they remain more than "voluntary association[s]
with a cause."41 Is this suggestion plausible, or attractive?
35 Id. at 65.
36 See Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, The Distinctive Place of Religious Entities in our
Constitutional Order, 46 VILL. L. REV. 37, 51 (2002) (noting that "[t]he task of any over-
arching theory of the constitutional status of religious entitles is to identify and elaborate
the reasons, if any, that justify treatment of religious enterprises different from secular
organizations and from religious believers.").
37 See, e.g., Thomas Berg, Can Religious Liberty Be Protected As Equality?, 85 TEX. L.
REV. 1185 (2007); see also Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, The Limits of Equal Liberty as
a Theory of Religious Freedom, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1247 (2007).
38 See Richard W. Garnett, Free To Believe, FIRST THINGS 39 (May 2007).
39 Richard W. Garnett, A Quiet Faith? Taxes, Politics, and the Privatization of Religion,
42 B.C. L. REV. 771, 800 (2001).
40 Garnett, supra note 6, at 1853.
41 George Weigel, Papacy and Power, FIRST THINGS, Feb. 2001, at 18, 25; see Russell
Hittinger, Dignitatis Humanae, Religious Liberty, and Ecclesiastical Self- Government, 68
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1035, 1053 (2000) ("What was most important [for the Church in the
modern world] was that the Church could be differentiated without reducing itself to the
status of other private associations.").
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III. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND CHURCH AUTONOMY
As was noted above, the idea of church-state "separation" has,
for better or worse, long been at the heart of our doctrines and
debates about religious liberty under law. As Professor Witte has
noted, though, the so-called "wall" of separation has, in public
law and in public discourse, proved far more "serpentine" - both
in the sense of winding and twisting, and in the Edenic sense of
"seductively simple" - than many who invoke it appreciate. 42
I have suggested elsewhere that, whatever we might think of
Jefferson's "misleading metaphor,"43 or about the constitutionali-
zation of that metaphor in the Court's 1947 decision, Everson v.
Board of Education,44 it remains important that we get church-
state separation right. It would be a mistake either to embrace,
or to war against, a misguided version of the idea. 45
Well understood, "separation of church and state" would seem
to denote a structural arrangement involving institutions, a con-
stitutional order in which the institutions of religion - not "faith,"
''religion," or "spirituality," but the "church" - are distinct from,
other than, and meaningfully independent of, the institutions of
government.46 What is "at stake", then, with separation is not so
much - or, not only - the perceptions, feelings, immunities, and
even the consciences of individuals, but a distinctions between
spheres, the independence of institutions, and the "freedom of the
church." 47
42 JOHN WITTE JR., GOD'S JUSTICE, GOD'S JOUST: LAW AND RELIGION IN THE WESTERN
TRADITION 209 (2006).
43 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 92 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("It is impossi-
ble to build sound constitutional doctrine upon a mistaken understanding of Constitu-
tional history, but unfortunately the Establishment Clause has been expressly freighted
with Jefferson's misleading metaphor for nearly 40 years.").
44 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
45 See e.g., Garnett, supra note 11; see, e.g., John Courtney Murray, Law or Preposses-
sions?, 14 J. L. CONTEMP. PROBS. 23, 40 (1949) ("The absolutism of [Everson] ... is unsup-
ported, and unsupportable, by valid evidence and reasoning-historical, political, or le-
gal--or on any sound theory of values, religious or social.").
46 See generally, e.g., Steven D. Smith, Separation and the "Secular'" Reconstructing
the Disestablishment Decision, 67 TEX. L. REV. 955 (1989).
47 See generally, Richard W. Garnett, The Freedom of the Church, 4 J. CATH. SOC.
THOUGHT 59 (2007), from which some of the text that follows has been adopted.
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The first constraint to which King John agreed (but did not al-
ways respect), 48 in 1215, in the meadows of Runnymede, was
"that the English Church shall be free, and shall have its rights
undiminished, and its liberties unimpaired." And, more than a
century earlier, during what is usually called the Investiture Cri-
sis, the idea of libertas ecclesiae - i.e., the freedom of the church -
served, in Professor Berman's judgment, as the catalyst for "the
first major turning point in European history"49 and as the foun-
dation for nearly a millennium of political theory. Armed with
this idea, an eleventh century monk named Hildebrand - who
eventually reigned as Pope Gregory VII - not only orchestrated a
campaign in support of his struggle with secular powers for papal
control over the church;50 he led a "revolution" that, Professor
Berman reports, worked nothing less than a "total transforma-
tion" of law, state, and society.51 For Hildebrand and his allies,
the "freedom of the church" was the "assertion of papal primacy
over the entire Western church and" - more important, for pre-
sent purposes - "of the independence of the Church from secular
control." 52 What was at stake in Pope Gregory's famous confron-
tation with Emperor Henry IV at Canossa - as at the Cathedral
in Canterbury a century later, when the "meddlesome priest" St.
Thomas Becket was murdered by another ambitious King
Henry53 - was the "principle that royal jurisdiction was not
unlimited.., and that it was not for the secular authority alone
to decide where its boundaries should be fixed." 54
48 See F. POLLOCK & F.W. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, Vol. 1, 172 (2d
ed.) (Lawyers' Literary Club 1959) ('"The vague large promise that the church of England
shall be free is destined to arouse hopes that have been dormant and can not be ful-
filled.").
49 HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL
TRADITION 87 (1983).
50 See id. at 94 (quoting Introduction to G. TELLENBACH, CHURCH, STATE, AND
CHRISTIAN SOCIETY AT THE TIME OF THE INVESTITURE CONTEST xiv-xv (R.F. Bennett
trans., 1940)).
51 See BERMAN, supra note 49, at 23. See e.g., BRIAN TIERNEY, THE CRISIS OF CHURCH
AND STATE 1050-1300 (1988).
52 See id. at 50; see also WITTE, supra note 42, at 11-12 (noting Pope Gregory VII's
claim that "[olnly the pope ... had authority to ordain, discipline, depose, and reinstate
bishops, to convoke and control church councils, and to establish and administer abbeys
and bishroprics.").
53 In the Academy Award-winning 1964 film, BECKET, England's King Henry II -
played by Peter O'Toole - says of Thomas Becket, the Archbishop of Canterbury - played
by Richard Burton - "will no one rid me of this meddlesome priest?"
54 BERMAN, supra note 49, at 269.
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Now, no Justice of the United States Supreme Court has ever
mentioned - at least, not according to Westlaw - Hildebrand or
Canossa in any published opinion. Nevertheless, it seems worth
considering whether engagement with the Investiture Crisis,
Hildebrand's "revolution," and the idea of the "freedom of the
church" could contribute to a better, richer understanding of con-
stitutionalism generally and, more specifically, of religious free-
dom under law. After all, as John Courtney Murray once noted,
persons are not really free if their "basic human things are not
sacredly immune from profanation by the power of the state[.]"55
The challenge has long been to find the limiting principle that
would "check the encroachments of civil power and preserve
these immunities" and, it can be argued, "[w]estern civilization
first found this norm in the pregnant principle, the freedom of
the Church."56
It is tempting to assume that such a "revolutionary" principle
of limited government is deeply rooted in our Constitution's text,
history, structure, and doctrine, and readily available to supply a
well credentialed answer to questions about the differences be-
tween churches and the Boy Scouts. There are, as students of
the First Amendment learn, a number of constitutional doctrines
and lines of cases that guard religious institutions' ability and
right to control their internal structure and operations, to select
their own ministers, to propose their own messages, to adminis-
ter their own sacraments, to conduct their own liturgies, and so
on. 57 There is, for example, the above-mentioned doctrine of
"church autonomy" which, in Professor Bradley's words, is "the
issue that arises when legal principles displace religious commu-
nities' internal rules of interpersonal relations (as opposed to
prescriptions for personal spirituality)."58 So understood, Bradley
insists, "church autonomy" is the "flagship issue of church and
55 JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS: CATHOLIC REFLECTIONS ON THE
AMERICAN PROPOSITION 204 (1988).
56 See id. at 205 (arguing that it was freedom of the Church that furnished a "social
armature to the sacred order," within which humans would be "secure in all the freedoms
that his sacredness demands").
57 See Richard W. Garnett, Assimilation, Toleration, and the State's Interest in the
Development of Religious Doctrine, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1645, 1652-59 (2004).
58 See Bradley, supra note 3, at 1061. See generally Douglas Laycock, Towards a
General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relations and the Right
to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373 (1981).
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state," the "litmus test of a regime's commitment to genuine
spiritual freedom."59
However, even one disposed to agree with Professor Bradley
about the principle's importance should concede that, in fact, the
"church autonomy" doctrine is more of a grab-bag of precedents
than a clear rule or prohibition. The Court told us, in its bat-
tered-but-still-standing Lemon decision, that the First Amend-
ment does not permit state action that creates or requires "exces-
sive entanglement" between the government and religious
institutions, practices, teachings, and decisions. 60 It commands
that "secular and religious authorities . . . not interfere with each
other's respective spheres of choice and influence."61 In a line of
cases, 62 the Justices have refused to "undertake to resolve [reli-
gious] controversies" because "the hazards are ever present of in-
hibiting the free development of religious doctrine and of impli-
cating secular interests in matters of purely ecclesiastical
concern." 63 The Court has affirmed, time and again, the "funda-
mental right of churches to 'decide for themselves, free from state
interference, matters of church government as well as those of
faith and doctrine',"64 and deferred to church authorities and
processes "on matters purely ecclesiastical." 65 And, as was men-
tioned earlier, courts recognize a ministerial exception in dis-
crimination cases (although the Justices have not spoken directly
to the matter).66
All that said, it does not seem unfair to suggest that the doc-
trine has something of an imprecise emanations-and-penumbras
59 Bradley, supra note 3, at 1061.
60 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613-14 (1971).
61 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-12, at 1226 (2d ed.
1988); see also EUGENE VOLOKH, THE FIRST AMENDMENT: PROBLEMS, CASES, AND POLICY
ARGUMENTS 916-21 (2001) (discussing rule that "[tihe government may not delegate
certain kinds of government power to religious institutions").
62 See Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952); Presbyterian Church in
the U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969); see
also Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
63 Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. at 449.
64 EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 462 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (quoting Kedroff,
344 U.S. at 116).
65 Gonzales v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1, 16 (1929).
66 See generally NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979); Ohio Civil
Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Sch., Inc., 477 U.S. 619 (1986).
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air about it.67 Many scholars and courts locate the church-
autonomy rule in the Free Exercise Clause. 68 Others have looked
instead to the Establishment Clause's proscription on "excessive
entanglement."69 Some experts appear to regard the rule as an
implication from general, foundational religious-freedom princi-
ples, underlying the Religion Clauses, such as the "separation of
church and state"70 or the "voluntary principle."71 Professor Es-
beck has explained that the autonomy of churches follows from
the fact that the Establishment Clause is a "structural restraint"
on government (while the Free Exercise Clause protects indi-
viduals' rights of belief and practice).72 And, as was discussed
earlier, Professors Eisgruber and Sager find protection for
church-autonomy-as-autonomy within the privacy protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment, and adjacent to the freedom of ex-
pressive association.
What's more, it is not only the lack of a clear doctrinal and tex-
tual home that might raise doubts about the church-autonomy
doctrine. It is worth noting that one of the justifications some-
times invoked in church-autonomy cases is the asserted incompe-
tence of secular courts to resolve internal church disputes or to
interpret and apply religious rules. 73 Indeed, the immunity of
67 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) ("[S]pecific guarantees in the
Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help
give them life and substance.").
68 See Laycock, supra note 30; see also JOHN H. GARVEY, WHAT ARE FREEDOMS FOR?
139 (1996).
69 See, e.g., Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc'y of Jesus, 211 F.3d 1331, 1332 (9th Cir.
2000) (Wardlaw, J., dissenting) ("Though the concept originated through application of
the Free Exercise Clause, the Supreme Court has held that the Establishment Clause
also protects church autonomy in internal religious matters."); see also Lupu & Tuttle,
supra note 36, at 62 ("If anything in the positive law of the Constitution confirms the
distinctive character of religious institutions, the doctrine of non-entanglement is it.").
70 See, e.g., Mark E. Chopko, Shaping the Church: Overcoming the Twin Challenges of
Secularization and Scandal, 53 CATH. U. L. REV. 125, 131 (2003).
71 Thomas C. Berg, Church Autonomy and Establishments of Religion: Commentary:
The Voluntary Principle and Church Autonomy: Then and Now, 2004 BYU L. Rev. 1593,
1606 (2004).
72 Carl H. Esbeck, Church Autonomy and Establishments of Religion: Article: Dissent
and Disestablishment: The Church-State Settlement in the Early American Republic,
2004 BYU L. REV. 1385, 1592 n.2 (2004).
73 See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 715
("Intrafaith differences ... are not uncommon among followers of a particular creed, and
the judicial process is singularly ill equipped to resolve such differences."); see also
Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 714 n. 8 (1976) ("Civil judges
obviously do not have the competence of ecclesiastical tribunals in applying the 'law' that
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churches' internal decisions is framed as a function of their irra-
tionality, as a result of the asserted fact that "religious truth by
its nature [is] not subject to a test of validity determined by ra-
tional thought and empiric knowledge."74 However, the fact that
religious teaching and practices often involve recourse to, and re-
liance on, revelation - or on materials with which secular judges
are unfamiliar - does not seem a particularly strong reason for a
rule protecting churches' autonomy in matters of governance and
structure. Judges confront new substantive areas all the time,
and the issues in church-autonomy cases rarely have to do with
the truth or content of revelation. 75 Indeed, a church-autonomy
doctrine grounded ultimately, or even largely, on abstention-like
notions would seem to miss the point. The laws and canons of a
particular church or religious community need not be more in-
scrutable or inaccessible to a judge than those of any other entity
or voluntary association.
Again, then, the question: So far as the Constitution is con-
cerned, is a religious institution just an expressive association?
Are churches (just) like the Boy Scouts?
IV. CHURCHES, INSTITUTIONS, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
To review: We started with the fact that churches, like "expres-
sive associations," appear to enjoy an exemption from otherwise
applicable antidiscrimination requirements, and with the sugges-
tion that this is both a curious and an interesting feature of our
laws and conversations relating to religious freedom. According
to a recent and important book by two leading scholars in the
field, churches' right-to-discriminate does not - and, indeed, may
not - depend on their special constitutional status or on a thor-
oughgoing commitment to church-state "separation." It reflects,
instead, nothing more than the equal rights of religious believers
- i.e., their autonomy and privacy rights - to form associations,
governs ecclesiastical disputes."); see also Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 729 (1872) ("It is
not to be supposed that the judges of the civil courts can be as competent in the
ecclesiastical law and religious faith of [church] bodies as the ablest men in each are in
reference to their own.").
74 See TRIBE, supra note 61, at 1232 n. 46; see also Garnett, supra note 57, at 1658-59.
75 Cf. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 36, at 58-59 (noting that a "weaker" argument for




seek guidance and role-models, provide consolation and mentor-
ing, etc.
Given the power in our thinking, and in our traditions, of the
idea of "separation," it made sense to hesitate before joining Pro-
fessors Eisgruber and Sager in rejecting that idea, both as a gen-
eral rule and as the basis for churches' right to select ministers
without regulatory oversight. And, this hesitation seemed even
more warranted after we pushed deeper, past President Jefferson
and the Danbury Baptists, to the "revolutionary" significance in
the history of western constitutionalism of libertas ecclesiae. The
historical, structural significance of church autonomy, provides,
at the very least, reasons to be skeptical about the reductionist,
churches-as-expressive-associations account. And yet, even a far-
too-quick overview of the church-autonomy doctrine and its place
in constitutional law has left us wondering whether, in the end, it
is all just "equal liberty" after all.
If Professors Eisgruber and Sager are right, and the "separa-
tion of church and state" cannot supply a defensible, principled
distinction between the privacy and autonomy that is promoted
through the freedom of association and whatever goods or values
are served by churches' exemptions from antidiscrimination laws,
then what? The thoughts that follow are tentative and incom-
plete. Still, maybe they point in a productive, or at least provoca-
tive, direction. 76
Professor Schauer observed, about a decade ago, that First
Amendment doctrine tends to ignore institutions.77 Free-speech
law in particular, he contended, "has been persistently reluctant
to develop its principles in an institution-specific manner, and
thus to take account of the cultural, political, and economic dif-
ferences among the differentiated institutions that together com-
prise a society."78 Instead, the doctrine tends to employ speech
categories that reflect differences in "content" ("obscenity" and
"incitement", for example) or in public-property location ("tradi-
tional public forums", "designated public forums", etc.). This "in-
76 The thoughts that follow are developed in more detail in Richard W. Garnett, To-
ward an Institutional Understanding of the Religion Clauses, - VILL. L. REV. - (forth-
coming 2008).
77 Frederick Schauer, Principles, Institutions, and the First Amendment, 112 HARV. L.
REV. 84, 113-114 (1998).
78 Id. at 84.
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stitutional agnosticism" with respect to the "increasingly obvious
phenomenon of institutional differentiation," Schauer warned,
undermines the Amendment's implementation and the commit-
ments it reflects. 79 In the real world - i.e., the world to which le-
gal categories are applied and the salient features of which those
categories should capture and reflect - institutions differ, and
matter.
In recent years, a number of other scholars have been inspired,
or provoked, to take up Schauer's invitation to re-think the "in-
stitutional agnosticism" of First Amendment theory and doctrine.
Professor Paul Horwitz, for example, has contended that univer-
sities are "First Amendment institutions" whose special status
and function should be reflected in constitutional doctrine.8 0 Pro-
fessor Roderick Hills has presented an "institutional theory of
rights" that emphasizes the structural, power-dividing function
of private associations.8 1 David Fagundes has taken an "institu-
tional rights approach" to the problem of speech by government
entities and actors.8 2 At a February 2007 conference convened to
explore the "role of institutional context in constitutional law," 83
Schauer re-affirmed his view that "there are important institu-
tional distinctions that constitutional law systematically ig-
nores," suggested that recognizing and giving doctrinal effect to
these distinctions "might well serve deeper First Amendment
purposes," and again invited efforts to develop and defend insti-
tutional approaches and institution-specific categories.8 4 And,
Professor Scott Moss - while acknowledging the critique that
First Amendment doctrine is "institutionally oblivious" - has
79 Id. at 87.
80 See Paul Horwitz, Grutter's First Amendment, 46 B.C. L. REV. 461, 461 (2005); see
also Paul Horwitz, Universities as First Amendment Institutions: Some Easy Answers and
Hard Questions, 54 U.C.L.A. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2007).
81 Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Constitutional Rights of Private Governments, 78 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 144, 147 (2003).
82 David Fagundes, State Actors as First Amendment Speakers, 100 N.w. U. L. REV.
1637, 1668 (2006).
83 UCLA Law Review Symposium, Constitutional "Niches": The Role of Institutional
Context in Constitutional Law (Feb. 2, 2007).
84 See Frederick Schauer, Towards an Institutional First Amendment, 89 MINN. L. REV.
1256, 1257 (2005); see also Schauer supra note 77, at 118 ("If First Amendment doctrine
were subdivided along institutional lines, it is possible that the doctrine would be better
poised not only to capture important institutional differences, but also to recognize the
potentially distinct First Amendment status that the arts, universities, libraries, and
journalism, and possibly other institutions such as elections, possess.").
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highlighted and warned of the dangers that can accompany "ex-
cessive institutional tailoring" in free-speech cases arising in
prisons, workplaces, and public schools.8 5
So far, the conversation about the alleged failure of First
Amendment doctrine to capture, translate, and protect the im-
portance of distinct social, political, and other institutions has fo-
cused almost entirely on the Amendment's Speech and Press
Clauses and on the importance of certain institutions - newspa-
pers, universities, libraries, political parties, etc. - to those
Clauses purposes and underlying values. It seems both worth-
while and important, though, to consider the force and implica-
tions of Schauer's diagnosis in the context of the freedom of relig-
ion, and to explore the possibility of an institution-sensitive
approach to the First Amendment's Religion Clauses. Are there
institutions that, in Professor Horwitz's words, "play a funda-
mental role in our system of [religious freedom]"? 86 Others have
noted this possibility, and the promise of such an approach, but
have not yet pursued it.87 Have courts and commentators, in fact,
been "institutionally agnostic" when it comes to Religion Clauses
doctrine? Have the categories and doctrinal tools we use to
frame Religion Clauses disputes and decide Religion Clauses
cases missed, or mis-described, the role of institutions and insti-
tutional context? If so, what are the implications of this mistake,
and how might it be corrected? To what extent could or should
religious institutions be regarded in law as "Religion Clauses In-
stitutions" that contribute in a distinctive and important way -
in a way that distinguishes them from the Boy Scouts - to the
protection and exercise of religious freedom? Questions like
these tend, of course, to pull our thinking about "the separation
of church and state" away from questions relating to the role of
religion in civil society, or the place of religiously grounded ar-
guments in public life, and toward those involving the actual re-
lations between "church" and "state." And so, they might help us
identify what it is that the Religion Clauses govern as the rela-
85 Scott A. Moss, Prisoners and Students and Workers - Oh My! A Cautionary Note
about Excessive Institutional Tailoring of First Amendment doctrine, 54 UCLA L. REV. __
(forthcoming 2007).
86 Horwitz, supra note 80, at 589.
87 See, e.g., Schauer, supra note 77, at 117; see also Horwitz, supra note 80, at 12, 30-
31; Hills, supra note 81, at 149, 161-63, 183-84, 189-90.
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tionship, interactions, entanglements, and nexus between certain
religious institutions (the "church") and certain political institu-
tions (the "state").
An "institutional" approach to the Religion Clauses might pro-
ceed from a claim that the values that the First Amendment is
today understood to embody and protect - and, we might usefully
refer to this cluster of goods and values as "religious freedom" -
are well served by a civil-society landscape that is thick with
churches (and mediating institutions and associations of all
kinds) and by legal rules that acknowledge and capture their im-
portance. And, it might push us to think a bit more than we have
about religious institutions' status, rights, immunities, and obli-
gations. If "churches" have "rights", how is this true? If they
have "autonomy" or independence, what does this really mean?
To ask these questions is not even to come close to answering
them. Nevertheless: Following Professor Schauer and others, I
have suggested in this concluding part that institutions matter,
in the real world and to the values that, we think, the First
Amendment's Speech, Press, and Religion Clauses embody and
protect. That the much-maligned and often-misused idea of
church-state "separation" remains at the heart of our thinking
not only about the Constitution's religion-related provisions, but
also and more generally about religious freedom under limited
government suggests an opening for an approach to the First
Amendment that treats "churches" - like newspapers, political
parties, universities, libraries, expressive associations, etc. - as
"First Amendment institutions." That is, if newspapers and uni-
versities matter, in a special way, for the meaning and values of
the Free Speech Clause, and if we suspect - even if we are not
yet convinced - that it might make sense for free-speech doctrine
and categories to not be blind to the contours of these institutions
- then perhaps the same thing is true with respect to the Relig-
ion Clauses?
Of course, the relevant history of the First Amendment's Free
Exercise and Establishment Clauses is famously, even frustrat-
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ingly, contested. Their aims are multiple.88 Some seem clear,
others seem obscure. It is far from obvious what this provision
was understood to do, in terms of constraining the national gov-
ernment, let alone the states; and it is no less clear what it
should mean for us today. Even those of us who are sympathetic
to the view that, all things considered, constitutional provisions
should be understood and applied, to the extent possible, in ac-
cord with their original public meaning, have to admit that the
First Amendment's Religion Clauses serve primarily as vehicles
for the construction and implementation of one or another politi-
cal theories about the nature and value of religious freedom, the
merits and demerits of majoritarianism, the place of religious ex-
pression in the public square, and the appropriate relations be-
tween religious and political authority and institutions.
So, we can be resigned to the fact that the Religion Clauses'
meaning, purposes, and values are contested and contestable. It
is still true, we all agree, that the implementation, application,
interpretation, and enforcement of these Clauses is going to in-
volve the development and deployment of categories, doctrines,
and abstractions. Maybe we can also agree that the claims de-
veloped by others in the context of the Free Speech Clause, with
respect to the need for institution-sensitive doctrine, have some
force in the Religion Clauses context as well. Finally, we might
agree to consider the possibility that an institutional approach
could, and should, make room for, and build upon, the commit-
ments embodied in the ancient idea of the "freedom of the
Church," an idea that, with all due respect to the Boy Scouts, is
bigger than "be prepared."
88 See generally WITTE, supra note 42.
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